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A year ago an article appearing in the New Yorker magazine de-
scribed the courage of Alberto Mora, a Navy lawyer who warned his 
superiors at Guantánamo Bay about the abusive treatment of prison-
ers.  The article was written by Jane Mayer, one of the participants in 
the Seton Hall University School of Law’s Guantánamo Teach-In’s 
panel of journalists.  At the conclusion of her essay, Mayer quoted 
Mora expressing his dismay at Bush Administration lawyers who 
seemed to be unaware of history: “I wondered if they were even famil-
iar with the Nuremberg trials—or with the laws of war, or with the 
Geneva Conventions.”1
It is difficult to know just what the lawyers and their clients in the 
White House and the Departments of Defense knew about these mat-
ters, but Nuremberg seems a reasonable enough place to begin think-
ing about the issues which Guantánamo raises. 
The judgment of the International Military Tribunal (“IMT” or 
“Tribunal”) at Nuremberg set the modern standard of international 
criminal responsibility in wartime, though it hardly wrote on a blank 
slate.  The Nuremberg judgment—indeed, the Tribunal itself—was 
criticized for establishing categories of criminal behavior which had 
no prior international standing, including crimes against humanity.2  
But its reliance on crimes of war and crimes against the peace (ag-
gressive war) were firmly grounded in norms of international law 
contained in treaties to which most states, including Germany, were 
historically bound.  The judgment of the IMT refers repeatedly to 
principles and agreements located in pre-war treaties including the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
 ∗ Alan Sussman, J.D., L.L.M., N.Y.U. School of Law; B.A., M.A., University of Chi-
cago.  Visiting Associate Professor, Bard College; Co-Chairperson of the Guantánamo 
Teach-In project held at Seton Hall University School of Law October 5, 2006. 
 1 Jane Mayer, Annals of the Pentagon, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 41. 
 2 See WILLIAM BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD 
THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1970); see also Quincy Wright, The Law of the 
Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 43–48 (1947). 
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1928, the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of Prisoners of War 
of 1929, and others. 
Since Nuremberg, of course, the number of international trea-
ties addressing crimes of war has grown by a considerable degree, as 
has the number of state parties bound to their standards.  And gen-
eral acceptance of the need for transnational rules of warfare has de-
veloped such that hesitations about the legitimacy of the Nuremberg 
project may now be considered academic.  But there is value in 
briefly reviewing the Nuremberg principles, with specific regard to 
international treaty obligations and the treatment of prisoners, as we 
begin to read a compelling series of addresses and discussions of in-
ternational law and the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo.  The 
value for Americans, I suggest, lies in an understanding that while all 
four occupying powers (United States, France, Great Britain, and the 
Soviet Union) were equal members in the Nuremberg project, it was 
largely due to American insistence that the IMT was established.3
The London Agreement of 1945 and the subsequent charter 
which created the structure and procedure of the Nuremberg trials 
are primarily legal documents, setting forth matters of jurisdictional 
reach, due process for defendants, and so on.  But Nuremberg was 
more than a legal proceeding, and no one involved thought other-
wise.  A terrible war had just been concluded which claimed the lives 
of millions of combatants and millions more civilians.  Reports of in-
conceivably barbaric treatment of Jews, other minorities, and prison-
ers by the Third Reich were beginning to surface.  Memories of am-
bivalence or unwillingness of the victors of World War I—especially 
Americans—to prosecute war criminals at the Great War’s end bur-
dened the Allies’ minds.4  A legal proceeding was called for, certainly, 
but more necessarily, a statement had to be made which transcended 
the boundaries of law. 
This was to be accomplished in two ways.  First, the statement 
had to have international, if not universal, appeal.  It had to speak 
 3 See, e.g., BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE 
DOCUMENTARY RECORD, 1944–1945 (1982). 
 4 See MICHAEL MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL 1945–46: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 10 (1997).  An international “Commission of Responsibilities” 
was created at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to consider the question of dealing 
with war crimes.  Id.  After acrimonious debate, the Commission concluded against 
trials regarding the commencement of war but favored a tribunal for “violations of 
the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity.”  Id.  The American delega-
tion dissented, in part because “[t]he laws and principles of humanity are not cer-
tain, varying with time, place and circumstance, and according, it may be, to the con-
science of the individual judge.  There is no fixed and universal standard of 
humanity . . . .”  Id. 
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not just to the emotions of the victors but to the sentiment of justice 
of all mankind.  And second, to escape the taint of “victors’ justice,”5 
those who sat in judgment had to proclaim their willingness to be 
bound by the principles of the decision in the future. 
It was Justice Jackson, serving as Chief United States Prosecutor 
to the Tribunal, who promised to fulfill both aspirations.  On leave 
from the Supreme Court of the United States by request of President 
Truman, his opening argument is memorable not only for its rhetori-
cal brilliance but also for its strong moral tone.  Upon reading it 
more than half of a century later, one senses his attempt to draw a 
line, not in the sand, but in the chronology of mankind itself.  From 
the date of this trial, he seems to say, there will be allowed no further 
impunity for outrages upon humanity, even if sanctioned by state law.  
From the date of this trial, he proceeds, we will constantly be called 
upon as individuals and nations to place ourselves on one side of his-
tory or the other: there, in the past, with the men in the dock, on the 
side of lawlessness and tyranny; or here, on the side of civilized behav-
ior, which will be recognized henceforth by the principles the Tribu-
nal is being urged to impose.  In fact, Justice Jackson refers to the 
word “civilized” or “civilization” in his opening statement no less than 
fourteen times.  For example: 
The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so 
calculated, so malignant and so devastating, that civilization can-
not tolerate their being ignored because it cannot stand their be-
ing repeated.  
. . . 
The real complaining party at your bar is Civilization . . . Civiliza-
tion asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to deal 
with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this order of impor-
tance . . . .6
In the same speech, Justice Jackson was no less emphatic about 
the prosecuting nations’ obligation to the future.  In this remarkable 
passage, Justice Jackson distinguishes justice from vengeance, and in 
doing so recognizes that the former implies a duty: 
 5 Considerable legal and political ink has been spilled over this issue.  See, e.g., 
Harold Rosenberg, Nuremberg and the Corruption of Thought, NEW YORK REVIEW OF 
BOOKS, Jan. 20, 1997, reprinted in HAROLD ROSENBERG, THE CASE OF THE BAFFLED 
RADICAL 122 (1985); SHELDON GLUECK, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND AGGRESSIVE WAR 
(1946). 
 6 ROBERT JACKSON, THE NURNBERG CASE 30–31, 94 (1947).  Francis de Menthon, 
Chief Prosecutor for France, stated similar sentiments when he delivered his opening 
address two months later, referring to a crime against the spirit.  MARRUS, supra note 
4, at 91. 
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[I]t is hard to distinguish between the demands for a just and 
measured retribution and the unthinking cry for vengeance 
which arises from the anguish of war.  It is our task, so far as hu-
manely possible, to draw a line between the two.  We must never 
forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today 
is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow.  To pass 
these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as 
well.7 
The Tribunal’s final judgment, as we know, resulted in findings 
of guilt and the imposition of severe sentences for most of the surviv-
ing major Nazi officials.  But the judgment was not based on evidence 
of mere evil-doing; it was based on the conclusion that the defen-
dants violated the letter and norms of international law.  The IMT 
was most scornful of Germany’s transparent desire to be free of in-
ternational treaty obligations in general, and those which required 
the humane treatment of prisoners of war in particular.  The judg-
ment referred, for example, to a regulation of the German High 
Command, issued shortly after the invasion of the Soviet Union.  It 
deemed Russian soldiers undeserving of protection under the 1929 
Geneva Convention because the U.S.S.R. never ratified it (though 
Germany had), and because “Bolshevist” soldiers were not to be 
trusted.  The regulation stated: 
Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany . . . .  The fight 
against National-Socialism has become part of [the bolshevist sol-
dier’s] system.  He conducts it by every means in his power: Sabo-
tage, seditious propaganda, incendiarism, murder.  The bolshevist 
soldier has therefore lost all claim to treatment as an honourable 
opponent, in accordance with the Geneva Convention.8  
The pretext of the decree was that since the enemy soldier was 
untrustworthy (has any enemy been deemed otherwise?), he was un-
worthy of the very respect to which all captured soldiers are entitled 
by international law.  The decree was criticized almost at once by 
Wilhelm Canaris, a German admiral, who was struck by its faulty logic 
and permission for cruelty (Canaris later divorced himself from the 
Nazi enterprise and was implicated in an unsuccessful attempt to 
overthrow Hitler).  Canaris argued that whether or not Russia signed 
the Geneva accords, general principles of international law have long 
 7 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 33–34. 
 8 The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Vol-
ume IV Doc. No. 1519-PS, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/document/ 
nca_vol4/1519-ps.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2007); see also Judicial Decisions Involving 
Questions of International Law—International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg), Judgment 
and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 226 (1947) [hereinafter Judgment and Sentences]. 
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required the humane treatment of prisoners of war, and there was no 
compelling reason for Germany to act otherwise.9  But Canaris’s ob-
jection failed to carry the day.  A week later, a reply to Canaris was 
written by Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the German Armed Forces.  Keitel 
answered Canaris’s objection with a chilling syllogism: 
The objections rise from the military concept of chivalrous war-
fare.  This [war] is the destruction of an ideology.  Therefore I 
approve and back the measures.10
The Tribunal had no tolerance for such thinking.  Geneva was 
not about chivalry, and all wars are expressed in terms of ideology.  
Keitel was later sentenced to death by the IMT for commission of war 
crimes.  In justifying its decision, not only against Keitel but other de-
fendants as well, the IMT repeatedly condemned the Nazis’ hollow 
defense of its abrogation of international law.  The judgment states: 
Everything [was] made subordinate to the overmastering  dictates 
of war.  Rules, regulations, assurances, and treaties  all alike [were] 
of no moment; and so, freed from the restraining influence of in-
ternational law, . . . War Crimes were committed when and wher-
ever the Fuhrer and his close associates thought them to be ad-
vantageous.11  
This much is commonly understood.  What is less well-known is 
that a subsequent series of trials was also held at Nuremberg in which 
less notorious Nazi officials and those who collaborated with them 
were prosecuted pursuant to Council Control Law No. 10. (“C.C. Law 
10”).12  This law was created at the same time as the charter for the 
IMT, by the same four nations, and for the same purpose, but the tri-
als it authorized were to be conducted by each nation in its own zone 
of German occupation.  It thus fell to the French, British, Soviet, and 
American occupying forces to select who was to be prosecuted and 
judged by each nation.  These “successor” trials, which occurred from 
1946 to 1949, are of interest to us today because the trials in the 
American sector constituted a wholly American endeavor.  The 
United States could have decided to prosecute no one, but instead 
selected an array of individuals whose culpability was more complex 
than, say, Göring or Speer.  They were not architects of evil designs 
but persons without whose cooperation the designs could not have 
 9 Judgment and Sentences, supra note 8, at 229. 
 10 Id. at 229, 282. 
 11 Id. at 224. 
 12 TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE 
NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1949). 
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been fulfilled.13  Eighty-six individuals were prosecuted by the Ameri-
cans pursuant to C.C. Law 10, including judges, lawyers, military com-
manders, doctors, cabinet ministers, industrialists (from Krupp and 
I.G. Farben), and death squad commandos.  Fifteen were sentenced 
to death and nineteen to life in prison.14  No one can say of the suc-
cessor trials that the United States went along for the international 
ride. 
Like the trials of the major war criminals by the IMT, the Ameri-
can trials held under authority of C.C. Law 10 paid close attention to 
German abrogation or dismissal of pre-war international treaties and 
violation of humane standards for the treatment of prisoners.  For 
example, in United States v. Krupp,15 the court authorized by C.C. Law 
10 referred to a decree of the Reich which swiftly dispatched the re-
quirements of Hague Convention.  The decree read: 
The regulations of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare which 
concern the administration of a country occupied by a foreign 
belligerent power are not applicable, since the U.S.S.R. is to be 
considered dissolved, and therefore the Reich has the obligation 
of exercising all governmental and other sovereign functions in 
the interest of the country’s inhabitants.  Therefore, any measures 
are permitted which the German administration decrees neces-
sary and suitable for the execution of this comprehensive plan.16  
Note: the defeated nation is no longer a nation, “therefore, any 
measures are permitted.”17  According to one of the American judges 
who sat in judgment on the Krupp case, “this policy, that the Hague 
Conventions were not applicable at all in Russia, was openly pro-
claimed and there was no attempt to keep it secret not to comply with 
the requirements of international law.”18
 13 Telford Taylor, Chief Prosecutor for the United States in these trials, states: 
“The responsibility for the selection of defendants in the Nuernberg Trials under 
Law No. 10 was mine alone . . . .  No one has been indicted . . . unless, in my judg-
ment, there appeared to be substantial evidence of criminal conduct under accepted 
principles of international penal law.”  Id. at 85. 
 14 FRANK BUSHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL PROGRAM IN GERMANY, 1946–1955 
175–78 (1989).  Some of the non-death sentences were reduced in 1951.  Id. 
 15 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, THE KRUPP CASE (1951). 
 16 Id. at 1471. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. (Wilkins, J., dissenting).  The dissent was from the acquittal of the defen-
dants of the charge of spoliation in occupied territories, not from the finding of guilt 
of the more severe charges of crimes against the peace and the use of slave and con-
centration camp labor.  Id. 
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The most interesting of the C.C. Law 10 cases, in light of the 
Teach-In on Guantánamo, is what is called the Justice Case, in which 
fourteen former German judges and prosecutors were charged with 
violations of the Hague Convention of 1907, the Geneva Prisoner of 
War Convention of 1929 and, as stated in the indictment, “the laws 
and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law derived 
from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, [and] the internal pe-
nal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed.”19
The Justice Case could have proved to be a delicate endeavor: 
judges judging judges; laws trumping laws.20  But the court did not 
have to engage in esoteric interpretations or legal quibbling.  The 
Nazi decrees created or enforced by the defendants were patently un-
just.  Consider the “Night and Fog” (Nacht und Nebel) decree, exam-
ined in the Justice Case.  (The decree has some relevance to the pro-
cedures discussed at the Teach-In.  The detainees at Guantanamo 
were seized under dubious circumstances, sometimes betrayed or 
sold for bounty, flown across a continent and ocean, held incommu-
nicado, without access to friends or relatives or witnesses, and “tried” 
in Cuba by their captors with secret evidence and no assistance of 
counsel.) The indictment in the Justice Case charged the defendants 
with participating in the execution of Nacht und Nebel project, 
whereby civilians of occupied territories who had been accused of 
crimes of resistance against occupying forces were spirited away 
for secret trial by certain Special Courts of the Justice Ministry 
within the Reich, in the course of which the victims’ whereabouts, 
trial, and subsequent disposition were kept completely secret, 
thus serving the dual purpose of terrorizing the victims’ relatives 
and associates and barring recourse to any evidence, witnesses, or 
counsel for defense.  The accused was not informed of the dispo-
sition of his case, and in almost every instance those who were ac-
quitted or who had served their sentences were handed over by 
the Justice Ministry to the Gestapo for “protective custody” for the 
duration of the war. 21  
The American Tribunal found ten of the fourteen defendants 
guilty.  The tribunal held that “[a]ll . . . who took part in enforcing or 
carrying it out knew that its enforcement violated international law of 
 19 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, THE JUSTICE CASE 22–23 (1951) [hereinafter THE 
JUSTICE CASE]. 
 20 See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593 (1958); Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 630 (1958) (debating whether or not Nazi law was “law”). 
 21 THE JUSTICE CASE, supra note 19, at 21. 
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war.  They also knew, which was evident from the language of the de-
cree, that it was a hard, cruel, and inhumane plan . . . .”22
This review of events which occurred in the 1940s in Europe has 
taken a long detour in time and space from Guantánamo Bay.  But 
we could do worse than study this history, and ask if we have forgot-
ten what Justice Jackson said we must never forget: that the record on 
which we judge the Nuremberg defendants today is the record on 
which history will judge us tomorrow.  We could ask if we have poi-
soned the chalice which he swore we were bound by justice to raise to 
our own lips. 
It was my pleasure to have participated in the organization of 
this Teach-In, the genealogy of which takes us back to an earlier war, 
which also aroused questions of law and human decency.  So it is 
good that this program is being broadcast to hundreds of colleges, 
seminaries, and law schools, as our nation’s future depends upon 
those who ask hard questions. 
 22 Id. at 1038. 
